


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196

23 November 1970

25X1

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Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017600070002-8

23 November 1970

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

USSR-BERLIN: The Soviets still have made no commitment on access guarantees. (Page 7)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017600070002-8

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A017600070002-8

*USSR-BERLIN: The Soviets continue to evade a firm commitment on access guarantees.

The Soviet representatives at an ambassadorial advisers' meeting on 20 November were unforthcoming on this issue. Instead, they brought up a formula for a three-part package agreement similar to a plan they had presented in September. An agreement in this form would incorporate a four-power document on general "principles" and corollary documents on access, inner-Berlin movement, and a reduction in the West German presence in West Berlin. The third and final part would in some way tie the various other pieces of the agreement together.

The corollary documents, according to the Soviets, would include a commitment on access guarantees in the form of an East German - Soviet exchange that the Soviets would then transmit to the Allies. The Soviets suggested that this procedure might circumvent the impasse created by Moscow's reluctance to comply with Western insistence on a detailed four-power understanding on access as a precondition for East German - West German bilateral talks on the subject. They moved no closer, however, to agreement on generally acceptable language on access guarantees.

The Soviets also indicated that Ambassador Abrasimov expected to discuss the West German presence at the ambassadorial meeting scheduled for today. This suggests that Moscow still wants to shift the focus of the talks from consideration of access, presumably in the expectation that bilateral talks between Bonn and Pankow will create pressures on the three powers for an agreement favorable to Soviet interests.

*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

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